In many decisions we cannot consult explicit statistics telling us about the risks involved in our actions. In lieu of such data, we can arrive at an understanding of our dicey options by sampling from them. The size of the samples that we take determines, ceteris paribus, how good our choices will be. Studies of decisions from experience have observed that people tend to rely on relatively small samples from payoff distributions, and small samples are at times rendered even smaller because of recency. We suggest one contributing and previously unnoticed reason for reliance on frugal search: Small samples amplify the difference between the expected earnings associated with the payoff distributions, thus making the options more distinct and choice easier. We describe the magnitude of this amplification effect, and the potential costs that it exacts, and we empirically test four of its implications.
Introduction
Being freed of tasks such as mating and territorial defense, worker bees are particularly well suited for evolutionary studies of choice (Real, 1992) . Time and again, they need to decide which area of potential food resources to exploit-a choice rendered thorny due to changing ecological conditions. Using an artificial patch of flowers with varying colors signaling different amounts and probabilities of nectar rewards, Real (1991 Real ( , 1992 investigated how a bee made choices in its uncertain habitat. He found that if a bee were maximizing expected utility, it chose as if it ''misjudges the objective probabilities and underestimates the rare event"-a finding that is in ''contrast with the conclusions of Kahneman and Tversky" (Real, 1992 p. S132). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) asserted that rare events-at least for humans-have more impact than they deserve according to their objective probabilities.
Investigations giving rise to the conclusion of opposite perceptions of rarity, however, have dealt their agentsbees versus humans-very different cards. In Real's studies (1991) bees were initially ignorant of the habitat's distribution of nectar and learned about their environment while foraging. What Real described as bees' misjudgments of rare events relates to the discrepancy between bees' implicit estimates of the likelihood of the rewards, inferred from their behavior, and actual probabilities. In contrast, during studies on how humans make decisions under risk, people receive perfect information about the payoff associated with each option and the probability of those payoffs (e.g., 3 with certainty versus 32 with probability of .1, 0 otherwise). They thus make what Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2004) referred to as decisions from descriptions, rendering foraging for information and estimating probabilities superfluous.
Perception of rarity and small samples
What happens when people, like bees, sample information from uncertain environments, thus making decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004) ? Such decisions represent situations in which, being ignorant of the payoffs, agents may resort to experience: experience garnered
